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(L. A. No. 20859. In Bank. JAn. 25, 194'.] 
MOUSHEK ClU.K.M.AKJIAN, Rc.-;pondcnt, v. JENNIE 
LOWE, Appdlant. 
[1] Workme~·. Oompcnsation-_,,"ctions Against Unin!!Ure4 Em-
ployers.-Tht> rieht of an injured employee uuder Lab. Code, 
i 3706, to briDle an ILction for dr.mages ngrunst an uninsured 
employ .. \' mILy be exercised inflep"udently of anyprocp.etlings 
b~fort· the Industrilll Accidl'nt Commi~;!ion. 
(2] Appeal-Review-Mattera After Judgment Appealed. From.-
On appelll from a jl1c4."IIlcnt for an injured em ployr e in liis 
damage action ngainst an wUnsured cmployl'r, the court CAnnot 
review the clAim that by reason of a subsequent compensation 
award there is a double recovery, since such question wa.s Dot 
before the trial court in the disposition of the action. 
(3a, 3b] Workmen's OompeDl&tion - Actions Against Uninsured 
Bmployera-Evidence.-ID an actioD by Iln injured saw oper-
[1] ~ 26 Oa.LJur. 263. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 14; [2] 
Appeal and Error, § 972; [31 Workmen's CompcDs:ttion, § 11; 
[4] Evidence, t L.1lT; [5, 6] Workml~n's ComllCD3ation, 119. 
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ator ngninst his uninsured employer, the stlltutory presllmption 
of defendant's nr.gligence (Lab. Code, § 3708) was not dispcllr.d 
by plaintiff's testimony that he operAted the ,','Was it '\"as 
"set up" for his use-and that "there was no chant'3 to put up 
a block," since sueb testimony 'Would support an inference 
that defendant· negligently maintnined the Raw in such cOlldi-
tion tbllt it 'Wa!; impossible to "put up a block," and that such 
negligence was the cause of the nccidClnt. 
[4] Evidence--Presumptions-Operation and E1rect.~A presump-
tion is dispelled as an evidentiary consideration when a fact 
whie,b is wholly irreconcilable with it is proved by uneonna-
dic~d t.est.imony of the party relying on it or of such party's 
own wit-nesses, where such testimony 'Was not the product of 
mistake or inadvertence. 
[5] Workmen's Compen:lation-Actions Against Uninsured Em-
ployers--AppeaL-In nn nction by an injured saw operator 
against his uninsured employer, whether the statutory pre-
sumption of defendant's negligence 'Was controverted 'Was • 
question to be determined by the trial court under the evidence, 
and its finding that plaintiff's injury 'Was the direct and proxi-
mate result of defendant's negligence 'Was conclusive on appeal. 
[8] ld.-Actions Against Uninsured EmploJlD-Appeal. - In an 
action by an employee IIgainst his uninSlll'ed employer, a find-
ing of the employer's negligence \vas conclusive on appeal 
where plaintiff's evidence fully disclosed the circumstances 
surrounding the happening -of the accident and that plaintiff 
had no choice but to use the tool provided for the work in 
r - question, and where its condition for safe usc was a factual 
If;' consideration in the light of the evidence. 
t.~, APPEAL from n judgment of the Su})~rior Court of Los 
t~gc~esCounty. Ruben S. Schmidt, Judge. AffirlDt..od. 
r' Action against uninsured employer for damages for per-
~fIOnal injuries sustained by employee. Judgment for plaintiff 
f;'ai'lirIDCd. ~" ' I' Stan_ & Stanton for A ppcn.n~ 
. \'HerlihY & Hr.rlihy and .Toseph W. Pierce for Respondent. 
':t ' 
.' SPENCE, J.-nnfcndant, an uninsured employer, appeal. 
,m L\ judgment for plaintiff rendered on account of injuries 
ined by plnintiff while in defendant's employ. As grounds 
9!· rcvcrs.'ll d~f~ndant urges: (1) the chrge of plaintiff'. 
~.u,ble recovery because in subsequent pruceedingll bclore Lhe 
~--. 
) 
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! -----------------------------------------~ one injury" in view of the 8'Ubsequent terminlltion of the in· 
~.dependent- proceedings before the commission in plaintiff's 
• favor. Whether defendant would be entitled to a credit of 
!" the judgment against the greater amount of the compensation 
t award upon plaintiff's undertaking to collect both amounts 
t as separately adjudicated by the designated t.ribunals is not 
~ a matter for consideration here (C/., 8ullivan v. Tait, 38 
i: Cal.App.2d 185 [101 P.2d 145]), for defendant contests the 
I validity of the judgment, not the premise of its enforcement 
.' in the admeasurement of plaintiff's total relief. In snch dis-
; tinguishable circumstances, the merit of defendant's objection 
to the successive awards as embracing a "double recovery" 
'.' ii'not an issue for review within the scope of this appeal. 
j ~ [Sa] There now remains for considr.ration defendant's 
challenge of the evidentiary support for the court's finding ~. of negligence as the issue was tendered by the parties' plead. 
~;,iDgs. (Cf., Graybiel v. Oonsol.id.ated Associations, Ltd., supra, 
[16 Cal.App.2d 20, 26.) 8ectl0n3708 of the Labor Code, so 
f; far as here pertinent, provides that in an action such as the 
[~t one ". . . it is presumed that the injury to the em. 
i ployee was a direct result and grew out of the negligence of 
ft;he employer, and ~e burden o~ proof is uP.on the employer, to 
'. rebut the presumptIon of neglIgence. It 18 not a defense to 
the employer that the employee was guilty of contributory 
'. negligence, or assumed the risk of· the hazard complained of, 
;~~.t, Defendant argues that plaintiff's own testimony af-
r Ilmul~tively established that there was no negligence on her 
'p~ that the statutory presumption to the contrary was 
eiereby dispelled from the case, and there then remained no 
l..,nQ,en(~ which would sustain her liability for plaintiff's in-
There is no force to defendaut's position upon analysis 
. relevant porti~ns of therer.ora:'----',---- " .,.-,- , 
. It appears that plaintiff, while employed as a, saw operator 
in other capacities in defendant's cabinet shop, injured 
left hand-lacerations of the thumb and second and third 
ilngera-in the process of operating a power-driven ripsaw 
for the cutting of a piece of wood for a window frame. Plain-
'was alone at tHe time of the accident and was the sole 
I:!liritnles8 thereto. After testifying that he was experienced in 
operation of power-driven saws and demonstrating his 
loss of the use of his injured hand as affecting his 
employment in carpentry work, plaintiH gave this 
of the accident: That the saw he was using was "im-
in a small table" with "the motor operating it on the 
:';"';, 312 [33 C.2d 
side"; that "the saw" had ". guide" to set the "measure-
ments"; that "as I was cutting like this, because that got to 
do this way, see, from the top, the s:lW in turning in the bot-
tom, you have t.o get your piece on top like that and push 
right down on it, so the saw comes right on top here and cuts 
here to here (indicating)"; that "when I was doing this, 
this happened • • • hand • • • slip or jump, I don't know-
still it happened when I was going down this way, see. "Later 
in the trial as a witness for plaintiff, a safety inspector for 
the State Division of Industrial Safety, who had examined 
the saw in queStion and who had heard· plaintiff's testimony 
., concerning the way he cut this piece by holding it, one end 
of it with hit left hand • • • the other end with his right hand 
••• lowering the thing over the saw," testified as follows: 
That the manner in which plaintiff described his operation 
of the 8&W was "the customary method.. . . in small back 
yard shops"; that "one of the reasons why I am in the field 
[is] that we try to discourage such manual operations to pre-
vent just what· happened to [plaintiff] .•• it is common 
. practice • • • it ian't safe practice." The inspector further 
stated that "anybody with any experience in cabinet work" 
should know that the use of a .. block" or "table stop" to 
"prevent the piece [as cut] from being kicked back," would 
guard against the happening of just such accident as the one 
here involved. Plaintif[ then testified that the saw was "set 
up" by hill [former] employer-the husband of defendant, 
who, upon her husband's death, had undertaken to manage 
the business and operate the shop; that he (plaintiff) made no 
change in "the machine at aU after [defendant's husband] 
died" but Continued to "use it" ai it was "set up"; that he 
"did ••• DOt set up a block before [he] used the saw"; and 
that "there was no chance to put up a block. It 
The court found that "as the direct and proximate re$1l1t 
of the ncglia-ence and carelessness of the said defendant, plain-
tUI'8 left' hand was then and there drawn into and became 
enlraged with the teeth of said saw." This is the finding that 
defendant att:lcks lUI running counter to all the evidence, ar-
guing that since it appears from plaintiff's own testimony that 
"defendant gave him no instructions as to the use of the saws; 
thl\t in fact she knew nothing about the use of the saws"; and 
that plaintif[ "himself [had] neglected to employ the known 
lafeguard of placing the block on the saw"; the rebuttable 
presumption of negligence imposed by statute upon defend-
ant (Lab. Code, § 3708, IUpra)" was dectively destroyed and 
) 
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the record stands devoid of any support for plnintifl"11 cause 
of action. 
[4] Gcnerally speaking, it may be statcd that a pr('snmp-
tion is dispelled as an evidentiary consideration when a. fact 
which is wholly irreconcilable with it is proved by the un-
contradicted 'testimony of the party relying upon it or of such 
party's own witnesses. when such testimony was not the prod-
nct of mistake or inadvertence. (Mar Shee v. Maryland As-
IUrance Corp., 190 Cal. 1, 9 [210 P. 269] ; SmelUe v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 212 Cal. 540, 553 [299 P. 529] ; Engstrom v. Au-
burn Automobile Sales Corp., 11 CaUd 64,70 [77 P.2d 1059] ; 
Westberg v. Willde,l' Cal.2d 360, 365 [94 P.2d 590] ; Fortier' 
v. Hogan, 115 Cal.App. 50, 57 [1 P.2d 23].) [3b] However, 
the situation here prevailing is distinguishable m that plain-
tiff's testimony is not "wholly irreconcilable" with the opera-
tive force of the presumption of defendant'. neJ!'ligence. On 
the contrary, conceding that as an experienced carpenter 
plaintiff should have used a "block" as a precautionary safe-
guard in his performance of the work in question, neverthe-
less his testimony that he operated the saw as it was "set up" 
for his use and "there was no chance to put up a block" would 
support an inference that defendant negligently maintained 
the saw in such condition that it was impossible to "put up 
a block," and that such negligence was th~ cause of the acci-
dent. As above noted, the common-law· defenses of contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of risk are expressly denied 
by statute to defendant in such action as the present one. 
(Lab. Code, §3708, supra.) [5] In such circumstances, whether 
the presumption of def\lndant'8 negligence was controverted 
was at best a question to be determined by the trial court, and 
ita finding thereon would be conclusive. (Fortier v. Hogan, 
.upra, 115 Cal.App. 50, 58.) 
[6] But even were it to be said that since plaintiff's evidence 
fully disclosed the circumstances surrounding the happening 
of the accident-his acts and conduct jUst prior to and at the 
time of his injury-there would be no reason for the presump-
tion of defendant's negligence to stay in the case and it dis-
appears therefrom (Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 
36, 38 [297 P. 884] ; Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Ca1.2d 111, 119 
[47 P.2d 709] ; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Ca1.2d294, 296 [65 P.2d 
65]), such conclusion would not aid defendant under the 
record. There would still remain as a factor in evidence the 
inference from plaintiff's testimony that defendant was guilty 
of negligence by reason of the particular manner of maiute-
) 
) 
314 CHAXMAKJIAN tI. LOWE 
nance of the saw in her cabinet shop-a consideration which 
would preclude holding, as a matter of law, that defendant 
was not guilty of fault in conclusive defeat of plaiutiff's 
damage claim. Defendant's citation of the case of Spwok v. 
Independent StJ8h If Door Co., 173 Cal. 438 [160 P. 565), does 
not strengthen her argument. There the plaintiff-a carpenter 
in defendant's employ-could have used a stairway provided 
by his employer as a safe means for passing from oue flour 
to another in the Course of his work, but plaintiff deliberately 
chose another means of approach and sustained certain injuries 
as the result of his needless risk. Accordingly," [t]he con-
cluSion [was] unescapable that the employer ... was without 
fault and that the injury occurred solely through the negli-
gence of the employee." (P. 44:0.) Here plaintiff had no 
choice but to use the saw provided by defendant for the work 
in question, and its condition for safe use was a factual con-
sideration in the light of the record. (Cf., Lewis v. Curran, 
17 Cal.App.2d 689, 695-696 [62 P.2d 800].) As so determined, 
the finding that plaintiff's injury was "the direct and proxi-
mate result of [defendant's] negligence and carelessness" 
is not open to objection as being without evidentiary support. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., con-
curred. 
TRA YN.()R, J .-1 concur in the judgment. 
It is my opinion th~ as a matter of legislative policy see-
tion 3708 of the Labor Code places upon the employer the 
burden of proof, which remains upon him throughout the 
case. (Compare, Hunter v. Hunter, 111 Cal. 261, 267 [43 
P. 756,52 Am.St.Rep. 180, 31 L.R.A. 411]; Wilcoz v. Wilcoz, 
171 Cal. 770, 774 [155 P. 95] ; Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 
82, 95 [183 P. 552, 7 A.L.R. 313]; O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 
Conn. 58, 65 [170 A. 486, 488] ; Am. Law Institute, Model 
Code of Evidence, rule 703.) The employer in this case has 
not sustained that burden. It therefore serves no purpose 
to consider when the presumption was dispelled. That ques-
tion would be pertinent only if the plaintiff had the burden of 
proof, aided by the presumption. (See dissenting opinion in 
Speck v. Saruer, 20 Cal.2d585, 590-598 [128 P.2d 16].) 
Edmonds, J., concnrred. 
